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Abstract 
The field of international relations is one of few corners of the social 
sciences in which it has been relatively easy to avoid an encounter with Karl 
Marx and Marxist thought. Arguably, the reverse has also been true. Whatever 
the reasons for that mutual ambivalence, this essay claims Marx as a serious 
theorist of the international, not just a pamphleteer or tactician. It does so 
primarily by rereading his response to the suppression of the Paris Commune, 
The Civil War in France. Marx’s essay, lively and provocative, challenges the 
distinction between ‘domestic politics’ and ‘international relations,’ and 
suggests that the ontological building blocks of international theory – the state 
and war – are revealed as historically unstable by ‘the most tremendous war of 
modern times.’ While Marx later reconsidered some of his analysis, The Civil 
War in France retains its interrogatory power especially in relation to 
contemporary instances of international political violence.      
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If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence, 
how are they to fulfill that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of 
criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in piratical 
wars the people’s blood and treasure? It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes, 
but the heroic resistance to their criminal folly by the working classes of England 
that saved the West of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade 
for the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic. 
The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, with which the 
upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus 
falling prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia; the immense and 
unresisted encroachments of that barbarous power, whose head is at St. 
Petersburg, and whose hands are in every cabinet of Europe, have taught the 
working classes the duty to master the mysteries of international politics; to watch 
the diplomatic acts of their respective Governments; to counteract them, if 
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necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in 
simultaneous denunciations; and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and 
justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules 
paramount of the intercourse of nations. 
 
- Karl Marx (1864, 519) 
 
 
A generation ago, Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank (1989) began 
their enigmatic book, Marxism and International Relations, with an understated claim 
that the two elements of the title ‘do not blend easily.’ If there was a distinct Marxist 
tradition of theorizing about international relations, a tradition for which they were 
prepared to make a case, its main feature was an ambivalence about the state-system that 
otherwise is the unquestioned core reality of the field (see also Berki 1984). More recently, 
Benno Teschke, whose work represents a rare and significant theoretical challenge to 
international relations from within Marxism, has pressed the claim further. On the one 
hand, he argues, the Marxist tradition from the start left the international and the 
geopolitical under-theorized. In Marx’s Capital, ‘the problem as to why political power 
constitutes itself territorially in the shape of a world system of politically sovereign states, 
whilst the world market as the sphere of private exchange assumes a universal form, is not 
even formulated as a research desideratum’; and, while Marx and Engels showed an 
increasing awareness of international relations in their later work, their interest was still 
closer to journalism and political tactics than it was theoretical (2006, 331, 332). On the 
other hand, Teschke acknowledges the considerable gap between his own work – in 
which ‘the economic and the political, the domestic and the international, are never 
constituted independently of each other,’ but are interrelated in a historically unstable 
dynamic of property relations – and much of mainstream international relations. Yet the 
subject itself, he writes, must be critically engaged. It is too important to be left to the 
dominant paradigm, neo-realism, which he describes as a ‘science of domination,’ a 
‘technology of state power pervaded by instrumental rationality,’ and a ‘siren song for all 
undergraduates’ – one that ‘obscures more than it reveals and compresses the rich history 
of human development into a repetitive calculus of power’ (Teschke 2003, 272, 274).   
Evidently ambivalence and neglect continue to cut both ways. International 
relations is still one of the few subfields within the study of politics, indeed the social 
sciences generally, in which it is possible in the Anglo-American world to avoid any 
encounter with Marx, though a generic Marxism – highlighting, say, neo-Gramscian 
hegemony or world-systems theory1 – is now the subject of a standard chapter at least in                                                         
1 A fuller contemporary survey of the field would note, in addition to Teschke’s work, the recent emergence 
in the UK of a position which claims a lineage through Trotsky and which engages the field of international 
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textbooks generated outside of the United States. Even among those who are inclined to 
concur with Martin Wight (1987, 1991) that theory in international relations is, in a 
fundamental sense, to be found in the dialogue among historically-embedded traditions 
of ideas and practices, or in the contested terrain of ideas, there is no rush to give Marx a 
seat at the table alongside such more familiar philosophical personages as Machiavelli, 
Grotius, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. He is typically absent, for example, from the 
anthologies of ‘classic’ texts (e.g., Forsythe et al 1970; Wright 1976; Williams 1998), or the 
collections of interpretive essays on ‘classic’ thinkers (e.g., Jahn 2006), both of which have 
been compiled in the construction of a kind of history of international political thought.2 
 The general neglect of Marx has been explained on ontological, political, and 
sociological grounds which do not need lengthy repetition here. They include the 
difficulty of reconciling a class-centred analysis and historical materialism with the 
common assumptions of academic international relations; the primacy of ‘social’ over 
‘international’ conflict in Marx’s own day; and the coincidence of the Cold War with the 
emergence of international relations as a subject of inquiry especially in the US (e.g., 
Thorndike 1978; Halliday 1987; Kubalkova and Cruickshank 1989, 11-13; Lynch 1987). 
Perhaps the weakest explanation is that Marx, together with Engels, gave no sustained 
attention to international relations either because they considered the state-system 
epiphenomenal or because they lived in a world made orderly by the Concert of Europe’s 
balance-of-power diplomacy. The fact remains that Marx was, if not a systematic theorist, 
then certainly a prolific and prescient commentator on the international politics of his 
day. The essays and pamphlets he wrote in response to European events, especially after 
the failed revolutions of 1848, suggest a preoccupation with such ‘conventional’ subjects 
as war and the balance of power – not for their own sake, of course, or as scholarly 
puzzles, but for the success of a future socialist revolution. 
 The purpose of this article is to read Marx as an international theorist. Modest in 
scope, it offers no synthetic reading of his entire corpus – least of all Capital – as it might 
be applied to international politics. Instead, its focus is a solitary text: The Civil War in 
France, ‘the most brilliant of Marx’s polemics’ (McLellan 1973, 400). Written in 1871, in 
English, the text is a lively, sardonic analysis of what it called the international character 
of class rule revealed in the smashing of the Paris Commune earlier that same year. It was 
Marx’s first popular success, though it quickly proved divisive on the left (Anderson 2010,                                                                                                                                                                      
relations through the lens of ‘uneven and combined development.’ See, e.g., Rosenberg (2010 and 2013). I 
would also note Radhika Desai’s work on what she calls geopolitical economy (2013).  
2 There is a brief excerpt from The Communist Manifesto in Brown et al (2002) and from both The German 
Ideology and The Communist Manifesto in Williams et al (1993), whose intent is to transcend distinctions 
between ‘political’ and ‘international’ theory. See also Boucher (1998), who treats Marx as a political 
theorist of international relations. But this all amounts to limited engagement on what is the periphery of 
the field, though Marx’s influence is much more evident in the international political economy literature, 
for example, the contributions of important scholars such as Robert Cox. 
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152-53). Widely circulated in translation, it also solidified his notoriety as a dangerous, 
influential radical for European governments, security services, and editorialists.   
My interest here is as much pedagogical as it is theoretical or explanatory – a 
response to the problem of how to present and represent the subject of international 
relations in the classroom. My retrieval of Marx and a particular text is rooted in the 
understanding, first, that the intellectual positions, world-images, and historical 
trajectories offered to students to make sense of the international have arisen themselves 
out of specific social-political contexts and lived experiences; and, second, that when 
those perspectives are put into critical conversation, not just placed end to end, they can 
help to interrogate common-sense assumptions about the contemporary world. The Paris 
Commune is a particularly rich example in those respects. Though it may have 
represented only a short-lived political eruption, suppressed after 72 days in a shockingly 
brutal show of force, it stands out sharply against comfortable depictions of the ‘long 
peace’ of post-Napoleonic Europe; and it challenges the teleology of the ‘modern’ nation-
state and state-system with the reality of an alternative political form – ‘at once smaller 
and more expansive,’ more local and more international (Ross 2015, 5). The Paris 
Commune was a surprise even to those who built it. It puzzled Marx, too, even as it 
demanded a position from him.  
 
‘The Most Tremendous War of Modern Times’ 
 
 Marx’s admonition, cited at the outset of this paper, to master the mysteries of 
international politics was made in his inaugural address to the International Working-
Men’s Association (IWMA). This compact passage reflects his political thinking at several 
levels as it had congealed in the post-1848 period. Most obvious is his obsession with 
tsarist Russia, whose intervention against the short-lived Hungarian republic in 1849 was 
crucial to the restoration of conservative monarchy in Central Europe, and whose 
expansionist policies in the Crimea and Poland, he wrote, had to be checked. In an essay 
for the New York Herald-Tribune, Marx warned of the ‘Russian dream of conquest once 
more revealed to the world,’ and made possible by Europe’s economic crisis and political 
disarray (1853, 333). In 1863 Marx issued a proclamation attacking the betrayal of 
Poland, which ‘alone continues to protect Germany from the Muscovite deluge’; the cause 
of German unity and independence from Russian domination required a Polish buffer 
(1863, 354). A second theme is the distrust of foreign policymakers as much for 
recklessness with ‘people’s blood and treasure’ as for the clear-sighted pursuit of class 
interests. In a similar vein, Marx in the middle of the Crimean War had charged the 
British government for the amateurish state of helplessness that put the constitution at 
risk while 40,000 lay dead on the shores of the Black Sea (1855, 281-84). A third theme 
concerns the reliable political timidity of the bourgeoisie. A fourth, intriguingly – and 
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perhaps it was only meant to be read rhetorically – is the acknowledgement not just of the 
reality of distinct nationalities but also of the ‘simple laws’ by which to judge the relations 
between them. This deference to the law of nations, however, and indeed all of the above 
themes, must be set within the context of Marx’s fundamental commitments to 
proletarian internationalism and emancipation. His internationalism had been 
introduced in the slogans of the Communist Manifesto, which were repeated in the 
inaugural address (‘Proletarians of all countries, Unite!’). But, as Alan Gilbert writes, it 
was actual revolutionary experience that made internationalism so central and that gave it 
substance:  
 
This solidarity did not depend on an advanced level of productive forces 
within countries, let alone a great degree of capitalist penetration into a 
foreign economy. Instead, this internationalism derived mainly from a 
political fact: the likelihood of a common response by European exploiting 
classes, bourgeois and aristocratic, to a revolutionary threat affecting any 
one of them. (Gilbert 1981, 149) 
 
 Marx’s deliberate turn to the study of political economy after 1848, Gilbert argues, 
was scarcely a renunciation of revolutionary strategizing. While the general theory of 
capital that resulted has been interpreted as a shift towards economic determinism, it 
cannot be extricated from its location in a dialectical relationship with Marx’s more 
explicitly political writings and activity during the same time – that is, as a framework 
that permitted the contradictions of capitalist expansion to be grasped but that needed to 
be rethought constantly out of a willingness to learn from experience. Out of that 
theoretical framework of a materialist conception of history, Marx made practical 
journalistic judgments: on British rule in India, on the American civil war, on Bismarck’s 
wars of unification. His lengthier essays on the spectacular events of French politics – the 
Bonapartist coup, the suppression of the Commune – were also general theoretical 
exercises in the face of apparent novelty. Thus The Civil War in France in particular is the 
occasion for the claim that ‘class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national 
uniform,’ that national governments ‘are one as against the proletariat’ (Marx 1871a, 80). 
 The military-diplomatic circumstances of the Franco-Prussian War and the 
sequence of events resulting in the declaration of the Commune cannot be recounted here 
in any length. For my more limited purposes, the place to begin is Marx’s initial welcome 
of the French declaration of war on the basis that Napoleon III’s defeat could provoke 
revolution and, as he wrote to Engels, shift the centre of the working-class movement and 
socialist theory to Germany (McLellan 1973, 389-90). In an address drafted for the 
General Council of the London-based IWMA, Marx described the war as a defensive one 
on the German side, nonetheless noting that Bismarck had conspired formerly with Louis 
Bonaparte to crush popular opposition and that the ‘governments and ruling classes of 
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Europe’ had allowed the emperor to ‘play during eighteen years the ferocious farce of the 
Restored Empire.’ The address made two other important points. First, Marx urged the 
German working class not to let the war lose its limited and defensive character and, in 
particular, not to let their government accept Russian offers of support. Second, Marx 
took encouragement from the ‘unparalleled’ exchanges of goodwill between French and 
German working-class organizations, while their governments rushed into a ‘fratricidal 
feud.’ They were the signs of a ‘new society,’ one whose ‘[i]nternational rule shall be 
peace, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same – Labour!’ (Marx 1870a, 25-
27 passim). 
 Marx’s cheery proclamation can be read, alternatively, as a piece of 
pamphleteering meant to strengthen working-class resolve. Napoleon III’s rapid 
surrender and Bismarck’s occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, if anything, demonstrated the 
relative powerlessness of those confidently entrusted with the task of restraining 
Germany. Some who appealed for an honorable peace were jailed. Marx, in a second 
address, challenged both those who claimed the captured territory as historically German 
– by that reasoning, Brandenburg should be returned to Poland – and those ‘more 
knowing patriots’ who insisted only that it was necessary as a guarantee against future 
French aggression. The ‘lesson of all history,’ Marx argued, was that attempts to impose 
borders on the basis of the conqueror’s military interest ‘carry within them the seed of 
fresh wars’ (1870b, 3). Again, he urged restraint so that the victory gained by the sacrifices 
of German workers would not be turned into their defeat: 
 
[A]utocratic Russia must think herself endangered by a German under 
Prussian leadership. Such is the law of the old political system. Within its 
pale the gain of one state is the loss of the other. The tsar’s paramount 
influence over Europe roots in his traditional hold on Germany. At a 
moment when in Russia herself volcanic social agencies threaten to shake 
the very base of autocracy, could the tsar afford to bear with such a loss of 
foreign prestige? . . . Do the Teuton patriots really believe that liberty and 
the peace will be guaranteed to Germany by forcing France into the arms 
of Russia? If the fortune of her arms, the arrogance of success, and 
dynastic intrigue lead Germany to a spoliation of French territory, there 
will then only remain two courses open to her. She must at all risks 
become the avowed tool of Russian aggrandisement, or, after some short 
respite, make again ready for another ‘defensive’ war, not one of those 
new-fangled ‘localised’ wars, but a war of races—a war with the combined 
Slavonian and Roman races (Marx 1870b, 32-33). 
 
For the time being, Marx wrote, the politics of the ‘old system’ would require gestures 
towards an honourable peace – at least the restoration of a modicum of continental 
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equilibrium – and the recognition of the new French republic despite the dubious 
composition of its coalition government. 
 These short addresses made at the beginning and end of the six-week war form 
the background for The Civil War in France. The Commune itself was declared in March 
1871, six months after the emperor’s surrender, in the sudden vacuum created by the 
coalition’s capitulation to the Prussian siege and its departure for Versailles. As recent 
interpreters have noted, the turn of events surprised even those who had made revolution 
their life’s ambition (e.g., Merriman 2014; Ross 2015; Gluckstein 2011).  
The Commune was not the work of any one party or faction; it did not issue from 
a coherent, unifying manifesto. It was marked from the start, not surprisingly, both by 
personal rivalries and by disagreement over goals, tactics, and political authority. Its 
political meaning and historical significance have been debated ever since. The 
Commune might plausibly and minimally be described as a broad-based exercise in 
popular republican democracy and social reform under extreme conditions. It moved 
quickly to dismantle the organs of the centralized French state that was built under 
absolutism and then transformed, as Marx described it, into the corrupt, bloated 
Bonapartist parasite but also into the ‘engine of class despotism’ under conditions of 
industrialization that freed the fearful bourgeoisie from politics to concentrate on capital 
accumulation. The Commune abolished the standing army in favour of a citizen militia. 
It curbed police powers, cut public officials’ salaries, disestablished the Catholic Church, 
opened the schools and required the election of judges.3 While the Commune did not 
abolish private property, and while it kept the national bank intact, Marx was prepared to 
recognize it in The Civil War in France as the ‘political form at last discovered under 
which to work out the economical emancipation of labour’ (1871a, 60).  
Nonetheless, the Commune was embattled throughout its brief lifespan. The 
initial shots of the civil war were fired in an attempt by the Versailles government to 
reclaim artillery from the city. Parts of Paris were subject to sustained artillery 
bombardment. Finally, the Commune was defeated in a bloodbath – 17,000 dead, by 
Versailles estimates – soon after a deal was cut with Bismarck, accepting his peace terms, 
including prompt payment of heavy reparations, in exchange for the release of prisoners 
and the active assistance of German troops (Merriman 2014; Hobsbawm 1975, 200-202). 
 Marx, as is well known, was more equivocal towards the Commune than is 
apparent by the passionate tone of his essay issued in the heat of the moment (McLellan 
1973). His protest of the previous September against the German annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine had also counselled working-class restraint in France in the difficult                                                         
3 While the Commune inherited a longer struggle over the length of the working day and is credited 
famously with having abolished night-work for bakers, ‘Parisians still demanded warm croissants first thing 
in the morning, . . . making it difficult for the Commune to enforce the measure’ (Merriman 2014, 64). 
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circumstances presented by the siege and bourgeois control of the army and police (Marx 
1870b, 34). Marx did not discount the opportunity created by an ‘accident’ of history. But 
the Commune was not directly aligned with the radical politics of the International. It 
drew most of its inspiration and most of the members of its governing council from other 
branches of socialism (Proudhonist, Blanquist), as well as republican, liberal, and 
anarchist tendencies. The International’s Paris section had been handicapped by arrests 
just prior to the Franco-Prussian War. Marx, further, was critical of the Commune’s 
tactics – its too-scrupulous reluctance to take the offensive, its hasty devolution of power 
– even as he admired its ‘glorious deed’ of ‘storming heaven’ (1871b, 85). Marx and 
Engels did amend an 1872 edition of the Manifesto to account for the political 
achievement of the Commune (Gilbert 1981, 161). But the Critique of the Gotha Program 
(1875) declined to mention its example, and Marx later told a journalist that the 
Commune could have achieved a more helpful compromise with the Versailles 
government had common sense prevailed (Lichtheim 1964, 120-21). By that point, the 
International had been identified as being responsible for the Commune’s crimes, vilified 
by the European press, targeted by governments, and torn apart by its own factionalism. 
It proved too fragile to endure the political currents unleashed by the Franco-Prussian 
War (McLellan 1973, 388, 401-402). 
 Typically, the import of The Civil War in France has been found in its approving 
description of the Commune’s decentralized political form – the antithesis of the state, 
whose machinery could not simply have been seized and wielded for the purposes of the 
working class; instead, it had to be smashed. Read from the perspective of international 
relations, however, other parts of the essay gain in significance for their treatment of the 
cross-pressures of war, diplomacy and revolution. In Part I, Marx represents the coalition 
Government of National Defence as realizing that Paris in the new republic could not be 
armed without arming the working class and thereby making revolution possible in the 
event that the siege could be withstood. Capitulation to Prussia therefore was the one 
means of escape, though this option came with its own serious drawbacks. While the 
Second Empire had doubled the national debt and ravaged the country’s resources, 
Bismarck (the ‘Prussian Shylock’) now waited on French soil with a bill for the support of 
one-half million German troops, reparations, and interest: 
 
Who was to pay the bill? It was only by the violent overthrow of the 
republic that the appropriators of wealth could hope to shift onto the 
shoulders of its producers the cost of a war which they, the appropriators, 
had themselves originated. Thus, the immense ruin of France spurred on 
these patriotic  representatives of land and capital, under the very eyes and 
patronage of the Invader, to graft upon the foreign war a civil war – a 
slaveholders’ rebellion (Marx 1871a, 45). 
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The success of that rebellion would require the disarming and defeat of Paris. 
 Part IV begins with Bismarck’s machinations. He returned a slow stream of 
captured imperial soldiers ‘in numbers just sufficient to keep the civil war going, and keep 
the Versailles government in abject dependence’ (Marx 1871a, 69-70). Then he 
summoned its representatives to dictate peace terms. The balance of this concluding part 
has two principal themes. One is the hypocrisy of committing vengeful savagery in the 
name of civilization and justice4: ‘The civilization and justice of bourgeois order comes 
out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against their 
masters….A glorious civilization, indeed, the great problem of which is how to get rid of 
the heaps of corpses it made after the battle was over’ (Marx 1871a, 74-75). 
Against the world-wide ‘calumny’ that the government of Paris had been usurped 
by criminals, Marx pointed to the willingness of its people – women as well as men – to 
die willingly, and ‘in numbers unequalled in any battle known to history’ (Marx 1871a, 
76). Against the charge of incendiarism hurled by those who tore the proletariat apart, 
but could no longer return to ‘the intact architecture of their abodes,’ Marx responded 
that fire was a legitimate means of war. British forces, after all, had burned the Capitol in 
Washington and the Chinese emperor’s summer palace; Paris itself had been bombarded 
during the siege: 
 
To be burned down has always been the inevitable fate of all buildings 
situated in the front of battle of all the regular armies in the world. But in 
the war of the enslaved against their enslavers, the only justifiable war in 
history, this is by no means to hold good! (Marx, 1871a, 77). 
 
Finally, against the charge of shooting its hostages, the Archbishop of Paris among them, 
the Commune had done no more, Marx argued, than those European armies which had 
resurrected the practice on the continent and in India in the 19th century. In the case of 
the Commune, hostages had been taken in self-defence, and offers to trade them for one 
man – Blanqui – were refused, when the Versailles government apparently calculated that 
the Archbishop was most useful in ‘the shape of a corpse’ (Marx 1871a, 79). 
 The second, and more fundamental, theme in this final section concerns the 
discerning of a new period of world history – the internationalization of class conflict – 
which remained hidden to Bismarck while he gloated over the ruins of Paris. As Marx 
writes in two sharp paragraphs, which deserve full quotation despite their length because 
they show him at his full rhetorical powers:                                                         
4 The reference to the language of civilization is significant. The late 19th-century saw the introduction of a 
diplomatic discourse, in the age of empire, that determined the ‘standard of civilization’ to which non-
European polities, especially in Asia, were expected to conform in order to be admitted as fully recognized 
members of international society. Gong (1984) is one early exploration of this discourse.   
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For him this is not only the extermination of revolution, but the extinction of 
France, now decapitated in reality, and by the French government itself. With the 
shallowness characteristic of all successful statesmen, he sees but the surface of 
this tremendous historic event. Whenever before has history exhibited the 
spectacle of a conqueror crowning his victory by turning into, not only the 
gendarme, but the hired bravo of the conquered government? There existed no 
war between Prussia and the Commune of Paris. On the contrary, the Commune 
had accepted the peace preliminaries, and Prussia had announced her neutrality. 
Prussia was, therefore, no belligerent. She acted the part of a bravo, a cowardly 
bravo, because incurring no danger; a hired bravo, because stipulating beforehand 
the payment of her blood-money of 500 millions on the fall of Paris. And thus, at 
last, came out the true character of the war, ordained by Providence as a 
chastisement of godless and debauched France by pious and moral Germany! And 
this unparalleled breach of the law of nations, even as understood by the old-
world lawyers, instead of arousing the ‘civilized’ governments of Europe to declare 
the felonious Prussian government, the mere tool of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, an 
outlaw amongst nations, only incites them to consider whether the few victims 
who escape the double cordon around Paris are not to be given up to the hangman 
of Versailles! 
That after the most tremendous war of modern times, the conquering and 
the conquered hosts should fraternize for the common massacre of the proletariat 
– this unparalleled event does indicate, not, as Bismarck thinks, the final 
repression of a new society upheaving, but the crumbling into dust of bourgeois 
society. The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national 
war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer 
the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts 
into civil war. Class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national uniform; 
the national governments are one as against the proletariat (Marx 1871a, 79-80). 
 
By their actions, Marx wrote, European governments testify to ‘the international 
character of class rule’ while they denounce the IWMA – the counter-organization to ‘the 
cosmopolitan conspiracy of capital.’ What united workers across state borders could not 
be stamped out ‘by any amount of carnage,’ but only by governments stamping out the 
‘despotism of capital over labour – the condition of their own parasitical existence’ (Marx 
1871a, 81). 
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Marx as International Theorist 
 
 Marx emerges from The Civil War in France as a theorist engaged both within and 
against the ‘old system’ of international relations, mastering its mysteries with the 
purpose of transforming it. He is neither an abstract nor a romantic internationalist. As 
he subsequently wrote in the Critique of the Gotha Program, the pro-Bismarck press was 
right to observe that the German Social Democrats had ‘sworn off internationalism.’ They 
had borrowed slogans of ‘brotherhood’ from the bourgeoisie, whose internationalism was 
tangible in the form of trade, but had lost any idea of the international dimensions of 
their challenges to the German bourgeoisie or to Bismarck’s foreign policy. The class 
struggle, Marx wrote, was national in form but not in substance; for Germany itself was 
situated economically within the world market and politically within the ‘system of states’ 
(Marx 1875, 533-34). The world-image most appropriate to Marx’s analysis is not that of 
simple conflict between states but rather, to follow Fred Halliday (1990, 221), social 
conflict increasingly on an international scale, mediated and fragmented by states. Thus 
the Franco-Prussian War, the Commune, and its suppression constitute a single event – 
this in contrast to more conventional diplomatic-military histories that consider the 
Commune as a sideshow, a complication in the peace negotiations (e.g., Howard 1961). 
Marx makes no sharp distinction between international and civil wars. This is the future 
anticipated in The Civil War in France, with its juxtaposition of old and new worlds. 
While Bismarck annexed parts of two provinces – the old territorial impetus – ‘the 
Commune annexed to France the working people all over the world’ (Marx 1871a, 65). 
The reaction from the ‘bloodhounds of order,’ moreover, constituted in itself an 
unparalleled fraternization of conquering and conquered armies, and an unparalleled 
breach of international law. 
 Marx’s own response to this event straddles the two worlds. For all his 
revolutionary bravado, the rhetorical purposes of which should not be dismissed in 
relation to a rather demoralized movement, he was remarkably willing to appeal to 
international law, to conventional moral categories of self-defence and proportionality, 
and to a standard of international legitimacy by which Germany should be declared an 
outlaw. He pressed at an earlier stage for formal British diplomatic recognition of the 
French republic. He worried about old-fashioned gains for the tsarist state and about the 
threat of another, much larger war created by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, if 
France was driven ‘into the arms of Russia.’ In this way, Marx was attentive to what can 
be called the traditional dynamics of the European balance of power and to the effects – 
whether stabilizing or destabilizing – of German unification and Prussian militarism. 
 The point is not that Marx merits consideration as an international theorist 
because, and insofar as, he finally pays homage to the timeless and essential principle of 
the balance of power. There is no advance in admitting Marx to the canon only where he 
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addresses some pre-established set of problems or intersects with the vocabularies of 
other traditions (Thorndike 1978, 58).5 When answers are squeezed out of him to 
questions he does not pose in any direct way – the cause of war and the condition of 
peace, for example, to take one standard attempt at disciplinary delimitation – the effect is 
to abstract his thought from the historical context from which it arose and to which it 
was, in the first instance, addressed. Marx is preoccupied with the changing character of 
capital, class, and the state. His rough identification of new forces at work in the latter 
half of the 19th century, jostling with the old, corresponds in a striking way with Karl 
Polanyi’s account of the great transformation behind the outward appearance of the one 
hundred years’ peace sustained by the balance-of-power system. Polanyi (1957) concedes 
that the system was one of the institutions on which the peace rested, but argues that the 
ideological basis of its cohesion changed markedly in relation to economic changes. The 
first half-century was dominated by the Holy Alliance’s suppression of constitutionalism; 
the second half, at least after the ‘confused and crowded’ period of upheaval from 1846 to 
1871, saw peace moderated by high finance, which foisted constitutions on despots and 
made access to credit contingent upon good behaviour. The chief danger for European 
capitalists was general war between great powers; for trade depended on a stable 
international monetary system that could not operate in such a war. Marx, in retrospect, 
might have been overly fixated upon Russia and the Holy Alliance. But his writing is alert 
to the implications of a continent made increasingly interdependent by processes of 
accumulation. 
 Marx’s response to the Franco-Prussian War – ‘the most tremendous of modern 
times’ – also contains within it the suggestion that the nature of war itself was undergoing 
a transformation. His confidence at the outset that Napoleon would be defeated, when the 
French army was widely considered the best in Europe, reflects not only his famous scorn 
for the Bonapartist state but also the important influence of Engels’ considerable interest 
in military affairs. It was Engels who had anticipated in print the nature of the successful 
Prussian strategy and the significance of advances in artillery, troop movement and 
supply (Neumann and van Hagen 1986, 273). War in an age when the requirement of 
mass mobilization conflicted with working-class organization and popular discontent 
meant opportunity but also risk. Marx could welcome the French declaration of war 
because it would expose the weakness of the state, teach the proletariat to handle guns, 
and make revolution a distinct possibility. But war also brought the immediate risk that 
Europe’s two largest working-class movements would be divided against each other by 
rival patriotic appeals. The influence of Clausewitz’s despairing analysis of modern war as                                                         
5 Interestingly, Thorndike’s account of a revolutionary-Marxist tradition makes no reference to The Civil 
War in France or the Commune, which are not mentioned at all in Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1989) and 
only peripherally in Teschke (2003, 2006).  
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possessing a logic of its own, of the difficulty of reconciling political direction with mass 
mobilization, might have informed Marx’s passionate protest against the annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine.6 His concern that the old system was incapable of saving itself from 
military disaster – and that the proletariat would be insufficient to the task – was 
amplified by Engels in an introduction to The Civil War in France written in 1891 to 
mark the 20th anniversary of the Commune: 
 
[I]s there not every day hanging over our heads the Damocles’ sword of 
war, on the first day of which all the chartered covenants of princes will be 
scattered like chaff; a war of which nothing is certain but the absolute 
uncertainty of its outcome; a race war which will subject the whole of 
Europe to devastation by fifteen or twenty million armed men, and is only 
not already raging because even the strongest of the great military states 
shrinks before the absolute incalculability of its final outcome?  All the 
more is it our duty to make again accessible to the German workers these 
brilliant proofs now half-forgotten… (Engels 1891, 10). 
 
In this light, Marx’s reported allusion to revolution as the sixth great power, 
waiting to sweep aside the pentarchic order of Europe (Halliday 1990, 212; also 1999) 
yields a conservative as well as a radical reading. The threat of revolution made tangible in 
the Commune helped to reinforce at least a fragile sense of common interest and 
geopolitical discipline – if not political-doctrinal unity – among European states. It 
restrained war between them, even as it afforded the bloodbath of Paris. It arguably 
helped carry them through the Berlin Conference and the imperial remapping of Africa 
in 1884-85. Once the threat of revolution had evidently evaporated, however, and the 
weaknesses of proletarian internationalism were revealed, European diplomats, generals, 
and monarchs were again vulnerable to the possibility of ‘sleepwalking’ (Clark 2012), as 
they did, into a war which validated Marx’s and Engels’ fears. 
 The retrieval of The Civil War in France as a pedagogical tool has a number of 
merits related to the above interpretation. First, the text is a narrative of considerable 
power, however contingent and contestable some of its judgments about the Commune 
might be. It helps remove the imposing image of arid abstraction that surrounds Marx’s 
analysis of capital and situates him as a participant-observer within a particular time and 
place. It is part of the event it describes. Even its real-time exaggerations and especially its 
errors are themselves of theoretical interest. Its narrative invites rough comparisons to 
contemporary conflicts.                                                          
6 Clausewitz’s influence on Engels and secondarily on Marx is a subject of considerable attention in Gallie 
(1978), ch. 4. 
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Second, the text challenges lazy theoretical commonplaces in the field of 
international relations about the unitary, territorial, and sovereign state as representative 
of an undivided community. The subject of The Civil War in France is nothing like this. 
The politics of the Commune spill over state boundaries and confound commonplace 
distinctions between international relations and domestic politics. The communards 
imagined in words a shared political subjectivity, but one that involved citizens, or the 
people – not France or Empire; their space-time register was that of a city, and a city of 
migrants, rather than the nation-state (Ross 2015, 17).7 For that matter, the restoration of 
France after May 1871 was not a mere coming to national senses after a time of excess – 
the work of too many foreign radicals. It was not a matter of communal healing or 
purification or repentance. It began with summary mass executions in the streets, among 
other brutalities. With its regained coercive powers, the French state then imposed long 
prison sentences or forced exile to its South Pacific colonies for the surviving 
communards who had not escaped to more hospitable oases in Europe. Restoration also 
required that great monuments be built by state and church, that political authority be 
redistributed, and that certain memories be erased from public discourse. Marx’s text 
pries some of this open. Herein lies its interrogative power. It requires that what is merely 
assumed be articulated and defended. 
Third, and finally, the text snaps the spell of timelessness about the modern state 
and state-system that describes a good deal of international theory. It falls on the side of 
the historicists against the dull weight of ahistorical, structuralist, neo-realist argument. It 
recalls two worthy and elemental claims, often overlooked, that Martin Wight once made 
in Power Politics: first, that the state-system is ‘not the rule in history, despite the illusion 
that it is normal,’ so that its attendant revolution in loyalties begs inquiry; and, second, 
that its actual history over the past several centuries is divided about equally between 
what he called ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ periods – the former denoting a settled 
political-ideological consensus, the latter closer to international civil war. By that division, 
Wight suggested, it could reasonably be asked why the former should be called normal at 
all (1978, quotations at 2, 87, 92).8 Marx’s The Civil War in France is attentive, of course,                                                         
7 Magnussen (2011) makes the case that the city, typically assumed to be a ‘lower’ and mostly instrumental 
order of government, with less authority to act, in fact represents a different ontology of the political – one 
that involves the everyday experience of multiple authorities. It stands over against the ‘illusion’ or the 
imposition of state sovereignty, law, stability, and order – the focus of so much political theory, and 
international theory too. Magnusson’s general claim for the city as much more than a limited legislated 
creation of so-called higher authorities – more political, more enduring – pairs interestingly with Marx’s 
temporary interest in the Commune as the revealing of a new, emancipatory political form, whose urban 
setting, we might assume, was not accidental.    
8 I will leave for another occasion a proper defense of what may seem an oddly hospitable reading of Wight 
in relation to Marx, especially in those circles where Wight is typecast – if not much read – as a 
straightforwardly conservative or ‘realist’ British scholar in international relations in the 1950s and 1960s. 
My limited defense would start by placing Wight on the historicist side of what became an important divide 
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to the interplay of revolution and intervention in international relations, but also to the 
possibility of the new, the contingent, in the living spaces that people were making for 
themselves. His essay does not start from world-weariness about the world as it is and 
therefore must be. It represents one version of human beings making history, 
dramatically, in circumstances they did not choose. 
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